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CROWD-CLASSING INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATIONS IN A
POST-CLASS ACTION ERA
Myriam Gilles
Anthony Sebok
Class actions are in decline, while arbitration is ascendant.  This
raises the question:  will plaintiffs’ lawyers skilled in bringing small-
value, large-scale litigation—the typical consumer, employment, and
antitrust claims that have made up the bulk of class action litigation
over the past forty years—hit upon a viable business model which
would allow them to arbitrate one-on-one claims efficiently and prof-
itably?  The obstacles are tremendous: without some means of recre-
ating the economies of scale and reaping the fees provided by the
aggregative device of Rule 23, no rational lawyer would expend the
resources to develop and arbitrate individual, small-value claims
against well-heeled defendants.  But despite these complications, we
think there are at least two possible models  that might allow for in-
formal aggregation of like claims in at least some subset of cases.
One hybrid model would seek a judicial liability judgment upon
which serial, individual arbitrations could later rely.  The antecedent
judicial judgment could take a number of different forms, so long as
it has preclusive force that can be leveraged in subsequent arbitration
hearings.  A second, complementary model envisions “arbitration en-
trepreneurs” (either lawyers or nonlawyers) purchasing legally identi-
cal, individual claims which these legal capitalists believe to have
value in the arbitral forum.  Upon procuring as many discrete claims
as the market will bear, the arbitration entrepreneur would seek to
resolve the hundreds or even thousands of claims she has amassed in
a single arbitral session.  With one arbitration entrepreneur as the
lawful owner of a multitude of claims, this form of aggregation impli-
cates neither the prohibition against class arbitration nor the contrac-
tual definition of “a claim” subject to arbitration.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent rulings limiting class action litigation
make it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for lawyers to re-
present vast numbers of absent class members in court.1  In particular,
the Court has repeatedly endorsed class action waivers in arbitration
agreements, sending parties to individually arbitrate claims that would
1. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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otherwise have been litigated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 in the federal courts.2
While many commentators have questioned whether individuals
will indeed seek to arbitrate their disputes in light of these develop-
ments,3 we think the better question is whether plaintiffs’ lawyers
skilled in bringing small-value, large-scale litigation—the typical con-
sumer, employment, and antitrust claims that have made up the bulk
of class action litigation over the past forty years—will hit upon a via-
ble business model, which would allow them to arbitrate one-on-one
claims efficiently and profitably.
At first blush, the financial incentives for lawyers to seek out and
arbitrate individual, small-value claims appear quite weak.4  In the ab-
sence of some mechanism to achieve economies of scale—i.e., to re-
duce the otherwise exorbitant information and transaction costs of
individual claiming—no rational lawyer would expend the resources
to develop and arbitrate small-value claims against well-heeled de-
fendants.  Even in the best-case scenario,—say, a credit card com-
pany’s undisclosed policy imposing late charges on payments posted
after 1:00 PM on the due date5—determining the inception and extent
of the policy, what forms of disclosure are required by relevant laws
and regulations, the identity of the injured consumers, and other sali-
ent facts would require an army of lawyers and staff.  And this army
would necessarily have to deal with hundreds or thousands of individ-
2. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2012); see also AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
3. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 646 (2012) (“Nor should anyone expect
that consumers will actually go forward with one-on-one arbitrations, even as consumer arbitra-
tion clauses are liberalized to provide ostensible incentives to initiate proceedings . . . .”); Jean R.
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting Proce-
durally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 92 (2012) (exploring whether it is “realistic to think
that class actions might be replaced by individual claims” and whether “many individuals who
were blocked from filing class actions [will] proceed individually” in arbitration).
4. The financial incentives for the defendant run in exactly the opposite direction.  As David
Korn and David Rosenberg explain, the incentive for a defendant to invest heavily to defeat a
small-value consumer claim is the same in individual arbitration as in a class action: Concep-
cion’s “pro-defendant bias is endemic to the process of resolving common question claims in
individual arbitrations” and “occurs in the individual arbitration process because of the lack of
symmetry between the defendant’s classwide stake and each plaintiff’s recovery-specific stake in
the outcome of the common question litigation.”  David Korn & David Rosenberg, Concep-
cion’s Pro-Defendant Biasing of the Arbitration Process: The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1151, 1155 (2012).
5. Based on allegations made in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1104 (Cal.
2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
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ual clients, rather than simply a handful of class representatives, which
would itself absorb a tremendous amount of time and money.6
In all but the simplest cases, expert testimony and other expensive
forms of proof would be necessary—all of which would be on the law-
yers’ dime at the front-end and would be nonrecoupable,7 even if the
claims were subsequently successful.8  Further, the rules governing the
dominant arbitral bodies do not provide for consolidation of related
cases before a single arbitrator, nor is there any intra-arbitration res
judicata effect awarded to prior victories.9  Informal cost-sharing
achieved by centralizing expert work is further doomed by the confi-
dentiality terms that are standard in contemporary arbitration agree-
ments.10  Procedurally, therefore, individual arbitration provides no
incentives to consolidate or even serialize claims formally or infor-
mally: lawyers seeking to individually arbitrate our hypothetical con-
sumer fraud case across multiple plaintiffs would be guaranteed
neither the ability to bring these claims seriatim before the same arbi-
trator in a compressed time frame, nor to use the same expert report
or other evidence across multiple arbitrations, nor to rely upon prior
arbitral determinations of fraud, liability, or damage.
6. Adam Zimmerman, Flash Mob Litigation, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 3, 2012, 9:33 PM), http://
prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/01/class-actions-v-flash-mob-litigation.html (“Individ-
uals must develop their own evidence, retain witnesses, expend time, and support their claim for
damages with a well-grounded legal theory.  Most studies of small claiming patterns suggest that
these problems, combined with apathy, inertia and cognitive bias, will persist.”); see also Eliza-
beth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273,
1288 (2012) (reporting that plaintiffs’ lawyers and staff in the Vioxx Litigation Consortium  spent
1,601,150 hours interviewing, meeting, reviewing individual clients’ files at a cost of $13.5
million).
7. The bulk of expert fees constitute out-of-pocket costs that lawyers must pay during the
course of litigation.  While plaintiffs’ lawyers may seek reimbursement for costs associated with
generating an expert report upon successful completion of the litigation, courts are bound by the
limit of 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b), which sets expert fees at only $40 per diem. See Crawford Fitting
Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 439 (1987) (holding that in ordering reimbursement of
expert witness fees, the district court was limited to the amount prescribed by § 1821, which at
the time was $30 per day); see also In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 318 (2d Cir.
2009), vacated sub nom., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 13 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
8. This, of course, assumes that a single expert report could be retailed across multiple individ-
ual arbitrations,which remains an open legal question and may depend upon the confidentiality
provisions of the underlying agreement. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 42:22, Italian Colors Rest.,
133 S. Ct. 2304 (No. 12-133), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_12_133.
9. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (denying preclusive
effect to an arbitrator’s resolution of an employee’s Fair Labor Standards Act claim).
10. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d at 306–08 (finding the arbitration
agreement contains a confidentiality provision that effectively blocks that method of informal
cost-sharing because it precludes the introduction of evidence adduced in one arbitration in sub-
sequent arbitrations).
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Perhaps most critically, the amount of money an attorney could ex-
pect to make by bringing a series of individual arbitrations will not, in
most (perhaps all) cases, justify these significant expenditures of time
and money.11  Again, take our credit card late-fee example: even if a
group of attorneys were somehow able to identify a segment of af-
fected consumers, develop a streamlined and efficient means of
presenting the straightforward facts of each case to an arbitrator, and
“win” a significant number of these individual arbitrations, these law-
yers would still walk away with little or nothing for their efforts.  For
example, 33% of $30, even if multiplied by ten thousand claims, is
only $100,000—which would be utterly insufficient to cover the costs
of case intake, expert fees, neutrals’ fees, travel, and other expenses.12
And the availability of attorneys’ fees under fee-shifting statutes is
not, in itself, a reliable or realistic inducement in consumer cases.  Fur-
thermore, the rules of the arbitral bodies prohibit the separate award
of costs (unless authorized by an underlying fee-shifting statute), ren-
dering many arbitral claims net-negatives.13
11. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for
the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”); see also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Even if [plaintiff] were willing to incur approxi-
mately $200,000 to recover a few thousand dollars, she would be unable to retain an attorney to
prosecute her individual claim. . . .  [Plaintiff’s counsel] will not prosecute her individual claim
without charge, and will not advance the required costs where the [arbitration] [a]greement’s
fee-shifting provisions present little possibility of being made whole.”); Picardi v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 251 P.3d 723, 725 (Nev. 2011) (noting plaintiffs’ argument that “the class action
waiver was exculpatory because, in cases . . . where the individualized claims are relatively small,
it is almost impossible to secure legal representation unless those claims are aggregated with the
claims of other similarly situated individuals”); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 646 (“The
main problem will be attracting plaintiffs’ counsel: rational lawyers will be deterred by prohibi-
tive disincentives.”).
12. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 646 (noting that even the Concepcions’ case is not
as uncomplicated as it may appear and that they could “surely incur well over $25,000 in legal
fees to establish liability in a one-on-one proceeding”); see also J. Maria Glover, The Structural
Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1210
(2012) (“[I]t is inconceivable that a private attorney, who might have sufficient expertise in con-
sumer fraud, will have the economic incentive to root out consumer fraud if the only economic
gain to be had is through individual arbitrations.  The significant investment of resources re-
quired to identify wronged individuals and to pursue their small claims on an individualized basis
likely will not justify any eventual gains.”).
13. Although it is theoretically possible that a layperson could secure funding from a litigation
funding company in a jurisdiction in which so-called alternative litigation funding is legal, it is
obviously risky (and imprudent) to borrow against the possibility of later vindication—especially
when, as noted above, the compensation in a consumer case can be so small. See generally
Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011) (discussing the litigation
funding industry in the United States); STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGA-
TION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS (2010), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP306.html (discussing the same).  In any event, it
is highly unlikely that a consumer could obtain funds given that “consumer”-side funders do not
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In sum, individual, small-claims arbitration seems to mean exactly
that: claims are brought on behalf of one person without regard to
others affected by the same or similar allegedly injurious conduct.  An
arbitrator decides the claim, and if the plaintiff is successful, the de-
fendant pays the small amount at stake in the proceedings.  Further,
the presence of lawyers is discouraged (by the defendant, the rules of
the arbitral associations, and the arbitrator) because the proceedings
are meant to be quick and efficient, without procedural hiccups or
substantive overkill.  On this view, there seems little room to develop
a business model that harnesses the potentially large number of peo-
ple who are harmed in small ways by corporate practices, but who
may not have any knowledge of the harm or lack any incentive to
pursue their small claims.
Perhaps this analysis is too parochial, and in a post-class action uni-
verse, one must boldly consider options outside of traditional legal
contexts.14  Possibly, claimants themselves may become so frustrated
with corporate malpractice that they will seek out efficient means of
banding together through the use of social media and other technolog-
ical developments.  Indeed, we may already be witnessing the early
stages of an Internet-driven movement towards democratizing the
bringing of claims.  For example, California lawyer Heather Peters,
who had purchased a Honda Civic with electrical problems, decided to
opt out of the class action settlement and instead filed her own lawsuit
in small claims court.15  She also created a website to blog about the
process of filing and litigating the claim, opened a Twitter account for
brief updates, and posted a YouTube video of the car’s problems—all
in the hope of sparking a “small claims flash mob” of other Honda
purchasers to do the same.16  And it partly worked: nearly one thou-
sand claimants individually opted out of the class action settlement
fund litigation but only purchase a property interest in the future proceeds of a case funded by a
contingency fee attorney. See id. at 9.
14. And, it seems that corporate entities are sufficiently worried about this possibility to war-
rant our attention. See, e.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Consumer Advocates Form
“Anti-Arbitration” Organization, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.ballard-
spahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2012-10-09-consumer-advocates-form-anti-arbitration-
organization.aspx (“The attempted use of mass arbitration to destroy consumer arbitration does
a great disservice to consumers who stand to benefit from the efficiencies and economies inher-
ent in the arbitral process.”).
15. Jerry Hirsch, Civic Hybrid Owner Wins Lawsuit Against Honda, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2012,
at AA1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/02/business/la-fi-autos-honda-lawsuit-
20120202 (reporting that Ms. Peters opted out of a class action settlement that would have paid
her $100 and coupons towards the purchase of another Honda vehicle).
16. Jerry Hirsch, Car Owner Takes Legal Fight Away from Lawyers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2011, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/27/business/la-fi-autos-honda-small-
claims-20111227.
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and filed their own small claims suits against Honda.17  But Ms. Peters
was ultimately unsuccessful: while she won nearly $10,000 in small
claims court, she lost on appeal and was required to pay Honda’s
court costs.18  Nonetheless, her story underscores the possibilities that
exist when a single person can leverage social media and her knowl-
edge of an underlying claim to bring about a massive and untapped
response by claimants all over the country.  Indeed, Ms. Peters was
able to accomplish something that massive print and mailer class no-
tice rarely can: actual, engaged responses from injured parties seeking
remedies.
A related example is Consumers Count, an organization designed
to use social media “to help multiple consumers bring claims against
companies without resort to class actions.”19  Consumers can post
complaints about companies’ practices or products on the Consumers
Count website, and
once a “critical mass” of consumers have complained about the
same practice, Consumers Count will “spring into action” and refer
the complaints to a law firm which can then enter into fee agree-
ments with the multiple consumers and attempt to pursue their
claims whether in court, in arbitration, through referral to a govern-
mental agency, or in the press.20
On this model, motivated claimants could use Facebook, Twitter,21
Google+, and other social networking sites to locate and communicate
with potential claimants; gather information on potential claims via
YouTube, Shutterfly, Photobucket, Instagram, or Flickr; track claim-
ants via Pinterest, Foursquare, and Yelp; manage information on blog-
style platforms such as Tumblr; survey claimants on Reddit or Better-
ific to gauge experiences with specific arbitrators; raise money and so-
licit contributions on ActBlue or Kickstarter;22 and perhaps even offer
17. Honda Hybrid Lawsuit: Heather Peters’ Suit Is Taken into Submission by Judge, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2012, 6:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/20/honda-hy-
brid-lawsuit_n_1441913.html (reporting that 1,700 Honda owners were spurred by Ms. Peters to
opt out of the settlement and bring claims on their own).
18. Jerry Hirsch, Honda Wins Reversal of Civic Hybrid Small-Claims Judgment, L.A. TIMES
(May 9, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-honda-civic-lawsuit-20120509,
0,3088344.story.
19. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 124; see also CONSUMERS COUNT, www.consumerscount.org
(last visited June 26, 2013).
20. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 124 (quoting How it Works, CONSUMERS COUNT, http://www.
consumerscount.org/how-it-works (last visited June 26, 2013)).
21. Twitter is “[a] very popular message broadcasting system that lets anyone send alphanu-
meric text messages up to 140 characters in length to a list of followers.” Definition of: Twitter,
PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/57880/twitter (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
22. Kickstarter describes itself as “a funding platform for creative projects,” and it works by
having project creators post an idea and a funding goal, and if users like the idea, they can
pledge money.  If the project succeeds in reaching its funding goal, users’ credit cards are
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“litigation kits” via Groupon23 to enable claimants to easily bring their
own claims in arbitration.  This grassroots, tech-savvy approach to ac-
cessing, identifying, and enabling individual claimants to effectively
arbitrate disputes is further assisted by the increase in online arbitra-
tion methods.24  By leveraging the Internet’s vast resources and con-
nectivity,25 as have social and commercial movements around the
globe,26 claimants may be empowered to engage the arbitral fora in
new and powerful ways.27
But we think the grassroots model is ultimately incomplete, in part
because it is not “scalable.”28  While it may be trendy to contemplate
the impact of social media on all aspects of modern life, we remain
unconvinced that the ability to communicate in virtual communities
and networks will have significant effects in engaging injured claim-
ants.  The impediments that many scholars have described remain,
charged.  44% of Kickstarter projects have been fully funded, and Kickstarter applies a 5% fee
to funds collected. See Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101 (FAQ), KICKSTARTER, http://www.
kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%20basics (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
23. Groupon is a social media site that offers discounts on goods and services offered by its
advertisers.  The advertiser then pays Groupon a percentage of the fee earned by the advertiser
from registered Groupon users who obtain and use the discounts.
24. See Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176; see also Daren C.
Brabham, Crowdsourcing as a Model for Problem Solving: An Introduction and Cases, 14 CON-
VERGENCE: INT’L J. RES. INTO NEW MEDIA TECH. 75, 75 (2008) (“Crowdsourcing is an online,
distributed problem-solving and production model . . . .”).
25. See Irwin A. Kishner & Brooke E. Crescenti, The Rise of Social Media: What Professional
Teams and Clubs Should Consider, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Winter 2010, at 24, 24 (reporting on a
recent study finding “that 73 percent of Americans regularly use social media”). See generally
Matthew R. Auer, The Policy Sciences of Social Media, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 709 (2011).
26. See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS 166–68 (2008) (describing the striking use of flash mobs in antigovernment
protests in Belarus, which used text messaging and weblogs to bring protesters together, with
little or no advance planning).  See generally Molly Beutz Land, Networked Activism, 22 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 205 (2009).
27. A number of commentators have pointed to the increased reliance on networks and social
norms to replicate or improve accountability, access, and information in complex litigation. See,
e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91
B.U. L. REV. 87 (2011); Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000);
Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L.
REV. 863.
28. By “scalable” we simply mean taking a well-functioning, smaller scale program and repli-
cating its essential functions so that it can work in a similar fashion for more people. See Paul N.
Bloom & Brett R. Smith, Identifying the Drivers of Social Entrepreneurial Impact: An Explora-
tory Empirical Study, in SCALING SOCIAL IMPACT: NEW THINKING 11 (Paul N. Bloom & Edward
Skoot eds., 2010); see also Sternlight, supra note 3, at 118 (noting that, while using the internet to
identify potential claimants may be “effective in some cases . . . [where] consumers’ claims are
large enough and easy to identify,” but that it may not work in other contexts).
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even with the help of the Internet.29  We also worry that only the most
egregious, widespread, or newsworthy corporate conduct would pique
the interest of injured consumers, leaving most wrongdoing unremed-
ied.30  And, as Jean Sternlight writes, “it also seems unlikely that the
Internet can help many consumers win their claims.  Bringing a claim
is one thing, and winning that claim yet another.”31  In the end, it
seems to us necessary to engage the ability and experience of plain-
tiffs’ lawyers or motivated entrepreneurs in any enterprise that in-
volves “ferreting out,” investigating, and bringing small-value
claims.32  The question therefore remains: Is there a viable business
model that would allow plaintiffs’ lawyers or entrepreneurs to arbi-
trate small, individual claims efficiently and profitably?
We think there are two potential approaches that might allow for
informal aggregation of arbitral claims in at least some subset of ap-
propriate cases.  The first is a hybrid model, which seeks an initial
public determination of liability in court, followed by the contracted-
for, atomized serial arbitration proceedings (which, in our view, would
function in effect like damages inquests).  The public court determina-
tion might come about in several different ways.  In some cases, the
plaintiffs’ lawyers may be able to bring an individual claim in court,
seeking a declaratory judgment of the defendant’s wrongdoing.  This
29. Zimmerman, supra note 6 (“There are many impediments for individuals who choose to
litigate by themselves.  Individuals must develop their own evidence, retain witnesses, expend
time, and support their claim for damages with a well-grounded legal theory.  Most studies of
small claiming patterns suggest that these problems, combined with apathy, inertia and cognitive
bias, will persist.”); see also Sternlight, supra note 3, at 118 (asserting that few consumers see
notices or choose to respond, and are unlikely to be aware that “they are subjected to particular
small but incorrect charges on[,] [for example,] their cell phone bill,” and further stating that “we
all suffer from information overload as it is.  How many of us have ever even looked at the
websites that already list ongoing class actions from which one might seek relief, much less taken
any steps to benefit from such a website?” (footnote omitted)).
30. Cf. Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1258 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (finding only an
“infinitesimal” number of AT&T customers had filed arbitration claims), rev’d on other grounds,
673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v.
Concepcion, Wal-mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 110–11 (2011)
(reporting that between 2003 and 2007, only 170 consumers out of nearly 54 million subscribers
saw fit to access AT&T’s inexpensive arbitration procedure).  Critics of crowdsourcing have
noted that participants are a nonrandom sample of the population, and that a crowdsourced
project will often fail due to lack of motivation. See, e.g., Daren C. Brabham, Managing Unex-
pected Publics Online: The Challenge of Targeting Specific Groups with the Wide-Reaching Tool
of the Internet, 6 INT’L J. COMM. 1139 (2012), available at http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/
view/1542/751.
31. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 118.
32. Glover, supra note 12, at 1210 (“[T]he ferreting out of misconduct like consumer fraud
requires expertise frequently not in the hands of consumers. They are thus unlikely, on their
own, to possess or process relevant information in such a way that will motivate them to arbi-
trate.” (footnote omitted)).
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may be possible where there are any claimants who are not covered
by an arbitration clause, or where the demand for declaratory or in-
junctive relief is determined to be outside the authority of a single
arbitrator.33  In other cases, the judicial liability determination can
come about through public enforcement actions, whether brought by
agencies acting in a law enforcement capacity or by state attorneys
general in parens patriae.34  Indeed, enterprising plaintiffs’ lawyers
might even be well-advised to offer their services at a discount to pub-
lic enforcers in order to obtain the springboard of a judicial liability
holding.35
Once lawyers have obtained a judicial declaration of wrongdoing,
many of the financial disincentives to individual arbitration described
above are altered.  Most significantly, lawyers are spared some of the
expense of proving wrongdoing.  For example, in the case of an arbi-
tration-free client, lawyers would be able to recoup their fees and
other related costs of proving wrongdoing.  In the case of a public
enforcement action, those costs have been absorbed by the state.  In
addition, once relieved of the financial burden of re-proving liability
in each arbitration, lawyers need only identify and contract with simi-
larly situated claimants for serialized arbitrations.  And, even these
transaction costs are significantly reduced when discovery under the
hybrid model produces the identities of affected consumers, enabling
lawyers to contact potential clients to determine their willingness to
sell, assign, or otherwise have their claims arbitrated.36
With the fully enforceable judicial declaration in hand, lawyers
could then move to the arbitral fora to individually arbitrate claims in
33. There may be claimants whose contracts, by happenstance, do not yet contain a class ac-
tion waiver.  Lawyers representing those individual claimants in court can litigate liability, and if
successful, this judgment can be used in subsequent arbitrations by similarly situated claimants.
The persuasive effect of these judgments is for the arbitrator to decide. See infra, text accompa-
nying notes 86-92.
34. Public entities litigate and obtain judgments on all manner of claims.  Importantly, these
enforcers are not subject to contractual waiver provisions; on the other hand, state actors often
settle for consent decrees with no admission of liability, which have no preclusive force in subse-
quent arbitrations. See infra Part III.A.
35. After all, public lawyers already “face resource constraints that limit the scope of possible
enforcement actions,” and given these shrinking state budgets and the growing list of potential
big-ticket claims involving harms to consumers and others, it would seem an ideal moment to
partner with the private bar.  Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 698, 761 (2011); see also David B. Wilkins, Rethinking the Public-Private Distinction in
Legal Ethics: The Case of “Substitute” Attorneys General, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 423, 427.
36. Arguably the most straightforward means of using Rule 23 to obtain the identities of in-
jured victims is through the notice requirement; although notice is often not required upon certi-
fication of a (b)(2) mandatory, non-opt-out class, the 2003 Amendments to Rule 23(c)(2)
nevertheless authorize courts to direct notice of certification to (b)(2) classes where class mem-
bers “have interests that may deserve protection by notice.” FRCP Rule 23(c)(2).
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what essentially becomes a series of damages inquests.  Here, a liabil-
ity judgment obtained may have preclusive effect on identical claims
and may generate the functional equivalent of precedent.  These ef-
fects are neither certain nor complete, as the major arbitral bodies
currently do not provide for mass, serial arbitration of like claims;
however, we predict that necessity will likely force these entities to
change or amend their rules in order to better manage mass claiming.
Up until now, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and
JAMs have had little reason to develop comprehensive solutions to
mass arbitration.  But in our view, these associations will inevitably
consider consolidation procedures, appointment of arbitrators quali-
fied to administer mass arbitrations, the admissibility of evidence and
expert testimony from prior, similar hearings, and other aggregation-
friendly rules.
The second and complementary model envisions “arbitration entre-
preneurs”—either lawyers or nonlawyers—buying up legally identical,
potentially valuable individual claims that are subject to arbitration.37
Upon procuring as many discrete claims as the market will bear and
which can net a profit, the arbitration entrepreneur would then file a
single arbitration seeking to collectively resolve the hundreds, or even
thousands, of claims she has amassed.  This claims-buying model re-
sembles previous efforts to individually process claims that had margi-
nal, but not negligible, value when viewed in isolation and significant
value when handled by a specialist or repeat player.38
We are taking the claims-buying model one step further and ex-
tending it to the next frontier for civil justice in the United States:
arbitration.  In doing so, we build on the precedent set in the debt-
buying industry, where firms purchase debt claims from credit card
companies, cell phone providers, and other providers of consumer
37. This arbitration entrepreneur would resemble the claims agents of yore—nonlawyers who
actively identified, investigated, processed, aggregated, and assisted injured parties in bringing
their claims in exchange for a fee or percentage of recovery.  Claims agents have a long and
somewhat controversial history in Anglo-American society.  Blackstone called them “the pests
of civil society,” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135, and early English courts re-
nounced them as “prowling assignees.”  Agents were held to be “officious intermeddlers” and
the doctrines of champerty and maintenance were deployed by courts to stop them from “stir-
ring up strife and contention” in pursuit of profit or some other self-interested motive.  Huber v.
Johnson, 70 N.W. 806, 807 (Minn. 1897).  However, as the Supreme Court has noted, resistance
to the claims agent gradually disappeared during the nineteenth century, so that “[m]any, proba-
bly most, American jurisdictions [allowed] an assignee” to help another enforce their legal rights.
Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 282 (2008) (quoting Charles E. Clark &
Robert H. Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 YALE L.J. 259, 264 (1925)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
38. See, for example, the cases discussed in Sprint Commc’ns, 554 U.S. at 280–81, cases that
involved “suits by individuals who were assignees for collection only.”
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credit, and bring massive numbers of individualized recovery proceed-
ings.  Consumer credit is a powerful example of mass small-claims liti-
gation that makes economic sense—although ironically, it is an
example in which the consumer is the defendant, not the plaintiff.39
Part II of this Article describes the current state of class action and
arbitration jurisprudence, with particular focus on the Supreme
Court’s recent pronouncements approving class action waivers in arbi-
tration agreements.  Part III takes up the hybrid model of securing a
“judicial launchpad” prior to engaging in mass arbitrations.  Part IV
focuses on the claims-buying model, which contemplates the interven-
tion of an arbitration entrepreneur modeled against the practices of
consumer debt buying companies in recent years.  Additionally, Part
IV explores the ability to freely buy, trade, assign, and sell claims in
arbitration, as well as the question of whether a single arbitration
seeking to represent collective claims can survive under current law
and practice.
II. THE END OF CLASS ACTIONS
Class action litigation is in decline.40  Over the past decade, the Su-
preme Court and a number of influential circuit courts have revealed
deep-seated skepticism (and hostility) to class action litigation, finding
doctrinal and policy-based rationales to support cutting back on this
potent procedural device.41  Standards for certifying high-stakes class
39. See Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Collection
After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711 (2006).
40. Although some studies show that the number of class actions filed has remained fairly
steady, others reveal that, given the increased evidentiary and burden of proof standards that
plaintiffs must satisfy, a significant number of these classes are not certified. Compare Stephen
C. Dillard et al., 7th Annual Litigation Trends Results, FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP 18–19 (Nov.
2, 2010), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/us/knowledge/publications/94436/7th-annual-litiga-
tion-trends-results, with Joel S. Feldman et al., Evidentiary and Burden of Proof Standards for
Class Certification Rulings, 11 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 536, 541 (June 11, 2010).  Se-
curities fraud class actions appear to be the exception. See JORDAN MILEV ET AL., NERA ECON.
CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2011 MID-YEAR RE-
VIEW 1 (2011), available at www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Mid-Year_Trends_0711(3).pdf (re-
porting that securities class action filings remained steady and suggesting that “a wave of new
cases alleging breach of fiduciary duty in connection with” mergers and acquisitions is the
cause).
41. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 626 (asserting that judicial decisions limiting
class action litigation are primarily concerned that “class practice allows private lawyers to as-
sume the representation of vast sets of absent plaintiffs and to use that power, monitored by no
one except overworked judges, as a club with which to extract massive settlements from risk-
averse corporations”); Robert H. Klonoff, Reflections on the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOYOLA
U. CHI. L.J. 533 (2012).
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actions have become increasingly more demanding,42 small-claims
consumer class actions have been fundamentally circumscribed,43 and
employment class actions must now meet evermore restrictive inter-
pretations of the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a).44  With few
exceptions,45 the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area has been
marked by an effort to limit, restrict, and reduce the availability of
class remedies.
A. Class Action Waivers
The real game-changer has been a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions upholding class action waivers and instructing lower courts to
enforce arbitration agreements according to their specific terms.46  In
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Court held
that the FAA prohibits arbitrators from imposing class arbitration on
parties that have not agreed to such procedures.47  Then in AT&T
42. Whereas courts previously avoided any “preliminary inquiry into the merits” at the class
certification stage, recent years have seen the development of a standard under which plaintiffs
are required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence—just as they would at trial—any fact
necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23, even if it also goes to the merits. See, e.g., In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316, 320 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[O]verlap between a
class certification requirement and the merits of a claim is no reason to decline to resolve rele-
vant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class certification requirement is met . . . .
Factual determinations necessary to make Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of
the evidence.”); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41–42 (2d Cir. 2006) (re-
jecting the “some showing” standard and adopting a requirement that plaintiffs provide “defini-
tive” proof, through “affidavits, documents, or testimony, to . . . [establish] that each Rule 23
requirement has been met”); cf. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (finding that
under a rigorous analysis of Rule 23(a)’s certification requirements, plaintiffs’ expert failed to
establish that damages can be measured on a class-wide basis).
43. Consumer class actions have been plagued by the adoption of an “implicit requirement”
of ascertainability, under which courts in consumer cases have refused to certify classes in the
absence of “reliable proof of purchase or a knowable list of injured plaintiffs.” See Myriam
Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Ac-
tions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 310 (2010).  This ascertainability requirement has sounded a
death knell for many (if not most) cases arising from small retail purchases, where consumers are
unlikely to retain proof of purchase. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir.
2013).
44. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
45. See, e.g., Amgen v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (finding proof
of materiality is not required before certifying a class based on the fraud-on-the-market theory);
Erika P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (plaintiff-friendly decision
finding that loss causation is not a component of reliance, and therefore is irrelevant at the class
certification stage); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1437–38 (2010) (upholding Rule 23 over inconsistent state law).
46. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 671–73 (2012); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1754–56 (2011); Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130
S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773–76
(2010).
47. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1758.
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Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court struck California’s so-called
Discover Bank rule—a judge-made rule providing that arbitration
agreements attended by class action waivers are unenforceable if
those agreements are contained in standard-form consumer con-
tracts.48  Most recently, in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Res-
taurant, a 5–3 majority held that class action waivers embedded in
arbitration clauses are enforceable even where proving the violation
of a federal statute in an individual arbitration would prove too costly
to pursue.49  In short, “the Court has nearly concluded its slow march
toward universal arbitrability.”50
Not surprisingly, many corporate actors have shrewdly responded
to this spate of judicial decisions by incorporating class action waiver
language in their standard-form contracts with consumers and em-
ployees,51 rendering these groups unable to band together and seek
legal redress.  Since 2000, when the Supreme Court began to develop
its pro-arbitration jurisprudence in earnest,52 a significant number of
companies have inserted arbitration clauses into their contracts with
consumers and employees.53  And it is a fair bet that the number of
48. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746, 1748, abrogating Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113
P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
49. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (“[T]he fact that it is
not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimina-
tion of the right to pursue that remedy.”).
50. David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights Doc-
trine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 724 (2012).
51. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Killing Them With Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly”
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Conception, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 847
(2012) (“[M]ost companies can quickly amend their clauses in response to or anticipation of
litigation outcomes, revealing a nimble and adaptive corporate feedback loop.”); Ann Marie
Tracey & Shelley McGill, Seeking a Rational Lawyer for Consumer Claims After the Supreme
Court Disconnects Consumers in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435,
440 (2012) (“It will take only seconds for businesses to amend unilaterally their online contracts
of adhesion and remove class actions from existence, assuming they have not already done so.”).
52. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) (“[W]e have
recognized that federal statutory claims can be appropriately resolved through arbitration . . . .”).
53. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 12, at 1167 (reporting on a study of contracts imposed by
financial services and telecommunications firms finding “that 75 percent contained mandatory
arbitration clauses, and 80 percent contained class action waivers,” and that “a stunning 93 per-
cent of these companies’ employment agreements mandated arbitration” (citing Theodore Ei-
senberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882–84 (2008))); see also
Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler,“Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbi-
tration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2004, at 55, 62 n.30 (finding that approximately 55% “of businesses that offer an ongoing prod-
uct or service” included an arbitration clause in the written contract); Peter B. Rutledge & Chris-
topher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1, 8 (reporting that 48% of
consumer credit card agreements contain arbitration clauses, and that 99% of those clauses con-
tain class action waivers).
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companies relying on arbitration clauses has spiked since the Court’s
2011 decision in Concepcion, where the majority lauded AT&T’s arbi-
tration clause as being fundamentally fairer and better for consumers
than litigation.54  As a result of the Court’s extended emphasis on
AT&T’s “consumer-friendly” arbitration clause, it “has become a sort
of gold standard to transactional attorneys,”55 and corporate advisors
are actively urging clients to follow AT&T’s model.56  Our research
indicates that clients have taken this advice to heart as an efficient
means of avoiding nearly all forms of aggregate liability.57
In the aftermath of Concepcion, lower federal courts have com-
pelled individual arbitration of otherwise class-able claims in the vast
54. AT&T’s arbitration clause provided that all fees and costs of suit were recoverable by a
prevailing plaintiff, and offered cash bounties where claimants receive an arbitration award su-
perior to defendant’s final pre-award offer, among other features. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at
1744 (discussing the AT&T Mobility Arbitration Agreement).
55. Gilles, supra note 51, at 848.
56. See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court Finds That Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements
Are Enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Apr. 27,
2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/USSupremeCourtFinds-ClassAction
WaiversInArbitrationAgreementsAreEnforceableUnderFederalArbitrationAct.aspx (“The
wording of the majority decision in AT&T Mobility does not seem to require similar provisions
in an arbitration agreement, although the Court did observe that the district court concluded
that the guaranteed amounts would put the Concepcions in a better position than if they were
participants in a class action.”); Alan Kaplinsky, Status of Overdraft Fee Litigation, in 16TH AN-
NUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES INSTITUTE COURSE HANDBOOK 209 (2011) (recom-
mending that banks facing class action liability on overdrafts—“only a handful [of which] have
arbitration provisions”—draft “the types of consumer-friendly features necessary to ensure en-
forceability”); Hilary B. Miller, What Payday Lenders Need to Do About Arbitration (May 2,
2011), available at http://myemail.constantcontact.com/What-Payday-Lenders-Need-To-Do-
About-Arbitration—-Now.html?soid=1101566873044&aid=SGkv356PqJU (“Lenders should
give serious consideration to updating their agreements to provide for every one of the con-
sumer protections included in the AT&T arbitration agreement.  In other words, at a minimum,
the lender-eats-fees provision, venue, preservation of small court claims, opt-out and bump-up
provisions of AT&T’s clause should be an element of any class action waiver provision.” (em-
phasis omitted)); see also JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.14 (8th
ed. 2011) (“Although Concepcion was not predicated on the existence of consumer-friendly pro-
visions, cautious drafting should lead companies to hew closely to the terms of the agreement
involved in that case and: [m]ake consumer arbitration low cost or cost-free [and] . . . [c]onsider
using premiums: financial incentives for customers or employees to arbitrate and allow arbitra-
tors to award attorney’s fees . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Second Circuit Strikes Down Class Arbi-
tration Provisions in In re American Express Merchants Litigation, WEIL BRIEFING: LITIG./REG.
(Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 26, 2009, at 3, available at http://www.
weil.com/files/upload/WeilBriefing_LitReg_090226.pdf (“Another option for businesses to con-
sider, to the extent they wish to increase the possibility that their class arbitration waiver provi-
sions will be enforceable under In re American Express, is the inclusion of a fee-shifting
provision for attorneys’ fees and expert costs.”).
57. See Gilles, supra note 51, at 829 (showing that thirty-seven major U.S. consumer-oriented
companies amended their arbitration clauses in the aftermath of Concepcion to add more con-
sumer-friendly provisions).
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majority of cases,58 and courts will likely continue to do so in the wake
of American Express.  And there seems to be no help in sight: neither
legislation overruling Concepcion59 nor regulatory measures render-
58. See, e.g., Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that
“[i]nsofar as Florida law would invalidate [class action waivers] as contrary to public pol-
icy . . . such a state law would ‘stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution’ of
the FAA, and thus be preempted” under Concepcion (third alteration in original) (citation omit-
ted) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011))); Simpson v.
Pulte Home Corp., No. C 11-5376 SBA, 2012 WL 1604840, at *5 (N.D. Cal May 7, 2012) (“In
view of Concepcion and its progeny, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ contention that the
class action waiver is substantively unconscionable.”); Emilio v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., No. 11
Civ. 3041 (BSJ), 2012 WL 917535, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 2012) (“Petitioner has not demon-
strated that any of his statutory rights would be precluded through the Court’s enforcement of
the class action preclusion provision . . . .”); Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., No. 11-cv-
779-bbc, 2012 WL 1242318, at *2 (W.D. Wisc. March 16, 2012) (finding plaintiff failed to prove
that the costs of individually arbitrating her claims would be prohibitive “because she failed to
conduct any comparison of the costs of litigating in federal court”); Coiro v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A., Civ. No. 11-3587, 2012 WL 628514, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2012) (“After considering the
evidence presented to it, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiff has met her burden in demon-
strating that enforcement of the class-action waiver would effectively preclude any action seek-
ing to vindicate proposed class members’ legal rights.”); LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11
Civ. 2308 (BSJ) (JLC), 2012 WL 124590, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012) (finding the evidence
of prohibitive costs of individual arbitration “too speculative to justify the invalidation of an
arbitration agreement” (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Alvarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. CIV. 2:10-27373 WBS
GGH, 2011 WL 6702424, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011) (refusing to consider public policy-
based arguments against enforcement of class action waiver because “those arguments are not
viable post-Concepcion [as] state laws advancing those policies are preempted by the FAA”);
Khan v. Orkin Exterminating Co., No. C 10-02156 SBA, 2011 WL 4853365, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
13, 2011) (where plaintiff is “seeking to establish that it is too costly for him to pursue consumer
protection claims on an individual as opposed to a class basis, the Court notes that post-Concep-
cion decisions have rejected the cost of litigation as a basis for invalidating a class action
waiver”); Clemins v. Alliance Data Sys. Corp., No. 11-C-36 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 12, 2011) (applying
Concepcion and enforcing class action waiver in credit card agreement); Chavez v. Bank of Am.,
No. C 10-653 JCS, 2011 WL 4712204 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); Tory v. First Premier Bank, No. 10
C 7326, 2011 WL 4478437, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2011) (“Concepcion moots any argument on
the cost benefits to the plaintiff of a class action versus an individual arbitration.”); Kaltwasser v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (declaring that
the vindication-of-right doctrine has no viability after Concepcion, at least insofar as class action
waivers are concerned); Black v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., Civil Action No. 10-848, 2011 WL
3940236, at *21 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2011); In re Apple & AT&T iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litig.,
No. C-10-02553 RMW, 2011 WL 2886407, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) (“Plaintiffs’ contention
that their modest claims ‘simply do not provide sufficient motivation for an aggrieved customer
to seek redress’ on an individual basis is the very argument that was struck down in Concep-
cion.” (citation omitted)); In re Cal. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-014341 JSW, 2011 WL
2566449, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2011); Villegas v. U.S. Bancorp, No. C 10-1762 RS, 2011 WL
2679610, (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2011); Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 10-05663 WHA, 2011
WL 1842712, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (finding that Concepcion forecloses argument that
an arbitration agreement is void because small claims might be prohibitively expensive to pursue
on an individual basis).
59. Congress continues to consider various versions of the Arbitration Fairness Act, which
would amend the FAA to invalidate all arbitration clauses in consumer or employment con-
tracts. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4, 155 Cong. Rec. H1517
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ing class action waivers unenforceable appear likely in the current po-
litical climate.60  To sum it up: we now exist in a world where
contractual bans on aggregate claiming are per se enforceable, where
every company has the option to exempt itself from class action liabil-
ity by simply adding a “consumer-friendly” arbitration clause to its
terms and conditions, and where the Supreme Court has repeatedly
hailed arbitration as providing a relatively inexpensive vehicle for ad-
dressing individual, small-value claims—one that is both more accessi-
ble than the courts and where claimants might fare at least as well as
they might in court.
These developments in class action and arbitration jurisprudence
foretell a massive transformation in adjudicative structures and proce-
dures, as claims shift from wholesale into arbitral fora.  Currently,
however, the major arbitral bodies appear ill-prepared for the on-
slaught of claims that may be coming their way now that public courts
have closed the door to many forms of aggregate litigation.
(daily ed. Feb 12, 2009) (invalidating agreements requiring arbitration of employment, consumer
and civil rights disputes); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong § 4, 153 Cong.
Rec. S9144 (daily ed. July 12, 2007) (invalidating agreements requiring arbitration of employ-
ment, consumer and civil rights disputes); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th
Cong. § 4, 153 Cong. Rec. H7774 (daily ed. July 12, 2007) (invalidating agreements requiring
arbitration of employment, consumer and civil rights disputes).
In the immediate wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion, Senators Al Franken
and Richard Blumenthal, along with Congressman Hank Johnson, reintroduced a 2011 version
of the bill, which would prohibit class waivers in all consumer, employment, and civil-rights-
related contracts.  This most recent version has also failed to garner much legislative support.
See Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A26 (noting that the chances of
federal legislation overriding Concepcion “aren’t great in the current political environment”).
And again, in 2013, anticipating the outcome in American Express, another version of the bill
was introduced in the House and Senate. See H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1844/text; S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s878.  And again, the odds of either even making it through
committee seem slim.
60. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), and required the agency to conduct a study of and submit a report to Congress on the
use of arbitration in consumer transactions, and “prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on
the use of . . . arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such
a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the pro-
tection of consumers.”  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1028(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2004 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (Supp. V
2011)).  The CFPB is currently running its arbitration study, but the embattled agency has other
items on its plate. See, e.g., Jennifer Bendery, Richard Cordray CFPB Confirmation Imperiled
by Senate Republicans, Again, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/02/01/richard-cordray-cfpb_n_2599838.html.
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B. Arbitral Unease with Aggregation
Arbitration, in its ideal form, allows both sides of a legal dispute to
trade the advantages of adjudication in a court of law in exchange for
advantages gained in so-called alternative dispute resolution systems.
Under basic economic theory, both contractual partners can benefit
from arbitration.61  It is theoretically possible that “individuals may be
better off agreeing [to] arbitration clauses instead of retaining their
right to go to court, if the resulting cost savings are passed on to con-
sumers through reductions in the price of goods and services [or] to
employees through higher wages.”62  It is even more likely that the
businesses—which employ and enforce arbitration clauses against
consumers, employees, and others—benefit from a combination of
fewer claims, reduced costs, and greater predictability in outcomes.
The idea that arbitration could work to the mutual advantage of par-
ties who were otherwise typically locked in conflict was a major rea-
son for the early enthusiasm for arbitration among progressives and
reformers.63
61. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 1, 5–7 (1995) (describing benefits that parties might derive from ex ante alternative
dispute resolution agreements).
62. Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 741; see
also Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—with Particular
Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 255 (2006) (“[W]hatever
lowers costs to businesses tends over time to lower prices to consumers.”); Stephen J. Ware,
Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J.
DISP. RESOL. 89, 91–93 (asserting that adhesion agreements to arbitrate are fair in that they
allow companies to pass on savings in costs from standard forms to their customers and
employees).
63. Arbitration gained prominence in the labor industry, for example, as a means of fostering
self-government and peace preservation. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 463 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (observing that judicial intervention in arbitra-
tion threatened “the going systems of self-government” (quoting Harry Shulman, Reason, Con-
tract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1024 (1955))).  An early arbitration
scholar, Frances Kellor, commenting on arbitration in general, noted that “any instrumentality
which reduces the burden of waste and cost of disputes to a nation is an activating power for the
advancement of civilization.” FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNC-
TIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 117 (1948).
Laura Nader has argued that the ADR movement gained momentum when elite lawyers en-
dorsed a “harmony model” of law, which turned away from a traditional conflict-driven legal
system (which had dominated the nation’s first 150 years).  Laura Nader, Controlling Processes
in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology,
9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 7 (1993).  To illustrate her point, Nader cited Chief Justice
Warren Burger, who extolled arbitration and “said lawyers should serve as healers, rather than
warriors, procurers, or hired guns.” Id. at 6. See also Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not
True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 85 (arguing that the premise
under which parties with legal claims prefer to resolve their “claims through mediation rather
than adversarial litigation and adjudication seems to be based on questionable assumptions and
debatable extrapolations from other social conflict contexts”).
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The reality is more complex, and the debate over whether arbitra-
tion can be beneficial for most potential litigants is tied up in argu-
ments over consent, access, cost, and the neutrality of decision
makers.64  This Article does not delve into these debates; rather, we
take the arbitral rules and practices as a given.  But we also predict
that these rules and practices may prove insufficient to the task of
administering and managing mass individual arbitrations under either
model we describe in the next two Parts—necessitating amendment
and revision to account for the impending surge of claims.
For example, the major arbitration associations and their supporters
often tout the “streamlined and efficient” manner in which arbitration
is conducted.65  These efficiencies are largely achieved by rules limit-
ing the parties’ ability to engage in fact discovery,66 exchange prehear-
ing briefs,67 rely on standard admissibility of evidence,68 or appeal
arbitral decisions.69 Arbitration hearings are restricted to brief
presentations of sworn evidence, with few of the procedures that serve
64. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Alternative Dispute Resolution Conflict as Pathology: An Essay
for Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1391, 1395 (1997) (attacking mediation because of power
imbalances for minorities in American society); Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary
Reflections on Where It Fits in a System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289, 303 (2003) (asserting the
importance of a conflict resolution “system that contains multiple procedures (e.g. both litigation
and mediation)”). See generally Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Ideal-
istic Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927 (2002).
65. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under Assault: Trial Lawyers Lead the Charge,
POL’Y ANALYSIS (Cato Inst., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 18, 2002, at 1, 3 (“[A]rbitration typically
reduces costs . . . by streamlining discovery.”).
66. For example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Healthcare Payor Provider
Arbitration Rules, which govern billing-related disputes, limit discovery to one deposition per
party unless ordered by the arbitrator.  AAA HEALTHCARE PAYOR PROVIDER ARBITRATION
RULES, R. 19, at 21 (2011) [hereinafter AAA RULES], available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/
ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004106&revision=latestreleased.  Similarly, American
Health Lawyers Association (AHLA) rules provide that the “arbitrator may allow the parties to
conduct such reasonable discovery and exchange exhibits as the arbitrator believes necessary or
appropriate . . . .”  AHLA RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION, R. 4.02, at 6 (2012). See
also Foremost Yarn Mills, Inc. v. Rose Mills, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (finding that the
FAA does not make discovery procedures available to parties to an arbitration).
67. See AAA RULES, supra note 66, R. 21 (describing preparation of an “Arbitration Record”
in advance of hearing, which should state facts both conceded and in dispute, in lieu of pretrial
briefing).
68. See AAA RULES, supra note 66, R. 30(a), at 25 (“Conformity to legal rules of evidence
shall not be necessary.”)
69. The FAA limits judicial review of arbitral awards to cases involving manifest disregard of
the law, see 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006), or “evident material mistake.” Id. § 11(a).  The Uniform
Arbitration Act and the acts adopted by most states allow an award to be vacated only upon the
showing of: (a) corruption, fraud or other influence exercised as a means of obtaining the award;
(b) evident partiality or misconduct on the part of the neutral arbitrators; (c) the arbitrators
exceeding their powers; (d) arbitrator’s refusal to postpone a hearing or refusal to hear material
evidence without sufficient cause; or (e) lack of agreement to arbitrate by the parties. UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 23, 7 U.L.A. 77 (2009); see also infra Part III.A.
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as markers of due process in the civil justice system.70  As critics of
arbitration have long argued, these seemingly neutral rules may have
disproportionately negative effects on consumers and employees.71
But, for our limited purposes here, these privately ordered modifica-
tions of the public adjudicative system will not have distinctly negative
effects on the models we describe, as they do not in themselves create
any obstacles to informal aggregation of claims.
Other rules may, however, prove deeply problematic to any effi-
cient massing of arbitrations.  Formally, it is now broadly accepted
that “[p]rinciples of stare decisis and res judicata do not have the same
doctrinal force in arbitration proceedings as they do in judicial pro-
ceedings.”72  This means that each arbitration stands on its own and
has no precedential effect on similar, unrelated arbitration proceed-
ings.73  And, because arbitrators lack the authority to enjoin ongoing
wrongful activity, each claimant bringing a separate claim has no over-
all impact on policy or practices that have widespread effect.
But even informally, the principal arbitral associations have
promulgated a set of rules and expectations that hinder any attempt to
generate precedent.  For example, the AAA currently requires that
“The mediator shall maintain the confidentiality of all information ob-
tained in the mediation, and all records, reports, or other documents
received by a mediator while serving in that capacity shall be confi-
dential.”74  Further, no arbitral body currently requires that a legal
70. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1974) (“[T]he factfinding pro-
cess in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding.  The record of the arbitration
proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and proce-
dures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testi-
mony under oath, often are severely limited or unavailable.”).
71. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 683–84 (1996) (asserting that the
arbitral rules limiting discovery harm consumers because the corporation is the party with all the
records, and the consumer is the one that needs access to them).
72. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Local 420, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
718 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Butler Armco Independent Union v. Armco Inc., 701 F.2d
253 (3d Cir.1983)); accord Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478, 483 (3d Cir.1981), aff’d,
460 U.S. 693 (1983); Riverboat Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd., 578 F.2d 250, 251 (9th Cir.
1978).
73. As a practical matter, however, arbitrators may take prior decisions into account, and
given the informal evidence rules of arbitration, it is hard to see on what grounds efforts to
include information about prior decisions could be excluded, even if they do not have any bind-
ing effect. See Korn & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1186 n.89 (“Arbitrators increasingly rely on
arbitral precedents—case records, orders, and awards—in making their decisions.”).
74. Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (Including Procedures for Large,
Complex Commercial Disputes), AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/search
rules/rulesdetail?doc=ADRSTG_004130&_afrLoop=1835164840780937&_afrWindowMode=0&
_afrWindowId=null#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D1835164840780937%26
doc%3DADRSTG_004130%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dk91veca6n_213
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record of the proceedings be kept.75  This means that, even in a juris-
diction such as California that requires publicity of arbitral awards,
there is no requirement that the arbitrator explain her reasons or pro-
vide any reliable analysis of the issues.76  The rules that shroud arbi-
tration decisions are bolstered by the underlying contracts of many
consumer-oriented companies, which specifically provide that “no ar-
bitration award or decision will have any preclusive effect as to the
issues or claims in any dispute with anyone who is not a named party
to the arbitration.”77
Moreover, it would be naive to assume that all of this can be dealt
with by back-end judicial review of arbitral decisions.  Section 10 of
the FAA limits such review to cases involving “manifest disregard” of
the law78—a high standard to satisfy that seems especially difficult
when an arbitrator’s regard for “the law” is opaque.
Taken together, these rules contemplate and conspire to silo indi-
vidual claims by removing any practical means of transmitting infor-
mation adduced or determinations made in one arbitration to
subsequent, related arbitrations.  Broad confidentiality and the ab-
sence of a written record make it virtually impossible to reproduce in
arbitration the collateral estoppel effects that create the efficiencies
witnessed in traditional litigation.79
(last visited Feb. 4, 2014).  While parties in traditional litigation can also obtain confidentiality
orders and submit documents and testimony under seal, obtaining privacy in traditional litigation
is a far more burdensome and less certain process than in arbitration.
75. Cf. House Grain Co. v. Obst, 659 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App. 1983); Gordon Firemark, Arbitra-
tion in Entertainment Contracts: Worth Fighting About?, LAW OFFICES OF GORDON P. FIREMARK
(March 24, 2011), http://firemark.com/2011/03/24/arbitration-entertainment-contracts-worth-
fighting-about/ (“[S]ince no written opinion exists, an arbitration award has little or no signifi-
cance as precedent for the parties or others to follow in future situations.”); Ted Johnson, Arbi-
tration Clauses Irk Creatives, VARIETY (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.variety.com/article/VR11180
45188 (asserting that because there is no precedential value from prior arbitration proceedings, it
is as if each new proceeding is like “groundhog day”).
76. AAA RULES, supra note 66, R. 41(b), at 28; cf. Press Release, Am. Ass’n for Justice, Civil
Justice System Uncovers Abuse and Neglect of Elderly Americans (Oct. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/justice/hs.xsl/13464.htm (predicting that “many offenses will never
see the light of day due to arbitration clauses” because, “[w]hile litigation has revealed instances
of abuse,” arbitration reveals nothing).
77. See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Agreement for American Express Card
Acceptance (Nov. 2012) [hereinafter AmEx Agreement] (on file with the authors).
78. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
79. See, e.g., Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1097 (D. Ariz. 2005) (“The
reasons for requiring arbitrators to apply res judicata and collateral estoppel are the same as
those underlying the doctrines themselves—finality, protection of judgments, prevention of du-
plicative litigation, and avoidance of inconsistent results.”).
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Indeed, the problem may lie deeper than the arbitral bodies’ posi-
tive rules or the unilateral ability of companies to add even more iron-
clad promises of privacy to existing arbitration clauses; the utter
absence of procedures designed to facilitate mass arbitrations is also
striking.  For example, neither the AAA nor JAMs currently have any
discernible rules on how to obtain a single arbitrator for a set of re-
lated arbitrations, how to schedule related arbitrations in a com-
pressed time frame, or how to use a single expert report across
multiple arbitrations.  There are no “best practices” governing dam-
ages calculations or the alignment of awards across arbitrations.  Nor
do the major arbitral associations currently offer volume discounts on
arbitral costs or neutrals’ fees for those seeking to arbitrate a mass of
related claims.
Yet nothing prevents one or all of the arbitral bodies from adopting
new practices designed to meet new needs of the parties before them.
In fact, if, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, a “fundamental
attribute” of arbitration (at least as intended by Congress) is “to facili-
tate streamlined proceedings,” then it is hard to see why arbitral bod-
ies would resist accommodating parties who must appear in related,
separate arbitrations by coordinating schedules, offering volume dis-
counts on arbitral costs or neutrals’ fees, or even providing greater
transparency about awards for similar claims.80
So while existing procedures are clearly designed to aid the individ-
ual claimant in the individual arbitration to resolve a specific, fact-
intensive dispute, we think claimants and lawyers will push for more
friendly procedures to maximize efficiencies, and that ultimately the
arbitral bodies will find workable mechanisms to manage mass arbi-
trations.  After all, there was a period (between Green Tree Financial
Corp.-Alabama v. Bazzle in 2003 and Stolt-Nielsen in 2010) during
which the AAA changed its rules to accommodate class arbitration.  It
eliminated the presumption of confidentiality and promulgated other
class-friendly procedures.81  These changes demonstrate that arbitra-
tion is a market-driven, private enterprise, and that the arbitral bodies
are fully capable of responding to changes in client needs and the legal
80. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (“The overarching
purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.” (emphasis
added)).
81. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES OF CLASS ARBITRATIONS, R. 9(a),
at 5 (2003), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents
/document/dgdf/mda0/~edisp/adrstg_004129.pdf.
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environment.82  The models we describe in the next two Parts are
heavily reliant on the ability of private arbitration to adapt to evolving
public needs.
III. THE HYBRID MODEL
One potential work-around to current anti-class action jurispru-
dence and the inefficiencies of individual arbitration is to leverage the
rules and authority of a judicial judgment to maximize the efficiency
of mass private arbitrations.  This hybrid approach, drawing on both
judicial and arbitral processes, will not work in all cases and faces seri-
ous challenges.  Nonetheless, we think the various pathways to ob-
taining a public liability ruling will motivate entrepreneurial lawyers in
a significant subset of claims.
A. The Public Liability Ruling
Lawyers seeking an enforceable judicial judgment upon which to
base subsequent serial arbitrations have a number of options.  This
may be possible where, for example, the arbitration clause specifically
denies the arbitrator the authority to grant injunctive relief in an indi-
vidual arbitration.  In this scenario, plaintiffs may argue that claims for
injunctive relief are properly before the court.83  One challenge that
plaintiffs will confront, even in the subset of cases where they can
show that broad injunctive relief is necessary, is the argument that
even claims for injunctive or declaratory relief must nonetheless be
brought in an individual arbitration hearing.  In other words, defend-
ants may argue that the individual plaintiff could obtain the broad,
and even potentially market-wide, injunctive relief in an individual
proceeding—and more specifically, in the contracted-for individual ar-
bitration.84  But it remains to be seen how many defendants will be
82. For example, in 1999, the AAA significantly revised its rules in response to concerns relat-
ing to discretion and authority of arbitrators.  Over the years, the Association has added Op-
tional Procedures for Large, Complex Cases, and amended the Expedited Procedures for small
cases to make them more efficient.
83. Of course, many of the cases comprising contemporary class practice do not implicate
injunctive concerns.  Oftentimes, the complained-of conduct has ceased by the time a class ac-
tion is filed, or by the time certification is sought.
84. See, e.g., Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1976),
(finding Rule 23(b)(2) class certification inappropriate where class treatment is not needed),
aff’d, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach,
493 F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir. 1974) (“Even with the denial of class action status, the requested
injunctive and declaratory relief will benefit not only the individual appellants . . . but all other
persons subject to the practice under attack.”); Ali v. Quarterman, No. 9:09cv52, 2009 WL
1586691, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 4, 2009) (justifying denial of certification because injunctive relief
in pending non-class action would provide same remedy); Access Now Inc. v. Walt Disney World
2014] CROWD-CLASSING INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATIONS 469
willing to allow plaintiffs to take aim at their nationwide practices in a
string of individual, largely nonreviewable arbitrations.85
A second pathway to a judicial ruling on liability that can be used in
the arbitral arena arises where there are some stray claimants who are
not bound by arbitration clauses, but who are similarly situated with
the claimants who are bound by such clauses.  This arises more fre-
quently than one might think86: large consumer-facing organizations
encounter massive challenges in managing multiple iterations of
agreements, phasing out legacy or grandfathered agreements, and reg-
ularizing terms and conditions in the wake of acquisitions and merg-
ers.87  Of course, the judicial liability ruling will have no value in the
arbitral arena unless the requirements of nonmutual offensive issue
preclusion are met.  But here, where the arbitral claimants by defini-
Co., 211 F.R.D. 452, 455 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (finding “complexity and expense” of class action
unnecessary when injunctive relief in a single case would provide same remedy); Fairley v. For-
rest Cnty., 814 F. Supp. 1327, 1329–30 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (determining class action unnecessary
because declaratory and injunctive relief would have same effect); Green v. Williams, No. CIV-
4-78-34, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17881, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 1980) (finding that “certifica-
tion of an action as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropriate where the injunctive and
declaratory relief sought . . . would automatically accrue to the benefit of the class members”
(citation omitted)).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 118–120 (describing AT&T’s response to thousands of
individual arbitrations filed to block its merger with T-Mobile); see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at
1752 (finding “it hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective means
of review”); Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012, at 107, 109 (asserting that “the very
narrow grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards may make the risk of an aberrational
award unacceptably high”); Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses
Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 454 (2010) (identify-
ing high-risk categories where defendants prefer litigation over arbitration); Sternlight, supra
note 3, at 91 (noting that “a company might hurt itself rather than consumers by eliminating class
actions, because the company might then face numerous individual claims brought in arbitra-
tion”—which may create a greater financial threat if injunctive relief is sought that could force
the company to change its practices in ways that harm its profitability).
86. Given how easy it is for businesses to add or amend arbitration clauses to their new and
existing agreements, one might assume that all companies have done so effectively in response to
recent pro-arbitration legal decisions. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 51, at 847 (noting that “most
companies can quickly amend their clauses in response to or anticipation of litigation outcomes,
revealing a nimble and adaptive corporate feedback loop”); Tracey & McGill, supra note 51, at
440 (“It will take only seconds for businesses to amend unilaterally their online contracts of
adhesion and remove class actions from existence, assuming they have not already done so.”).
87. A surprising example comes from Alan Kaplinsky, who observes that, in the Checking
Overdraft cases, where the players were sophisticated and well attuned to the dangers of class
litigation, a number of the defendant institutions were vulnerable because they failed to main-
tain class waivers with respect to some subset of their consumers.  Kaplinsky, supra note 56
(reporting that “only a handful [of banks] have arbitration provisions” leaving many vulnerable
to class action liability on overdrafts”).
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tion “could not [easily] have joined” the prior judicial proceeding,88
the test boils down to whether the issue in the two proceedings is
identical.
A third route to judicial resolution runs through the offices of pub-
lic enforcers.  If state attorneys general, administrative agencies, or
others establish critical liability facts in the course of judicial enforce-
ment actions, the predicate may be established for plaintiffs’ lawyers
to avail themselves of serial arbitration strategies.  For example, when
a state attorney general pursues a claim against a wrongdoer on behalf
of citizens of the state, she generally does so based on a state or fed-
eral remedial statute that specifically provides for a broad grant of
parens patriae authority to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.89
Those efforts can inure to the benefit of private lawyers, who may
employ judgments attained in enforcement actions in later arbitral
hearings alleging the same wrongdoing.  Indeed, it may be in the inter-
ests of private lawyers to enlist public enforcers towards these ends,
and even to offer their services at discounted rates.90
Whatever pathway to a judicial resolution is taken, this entire
model depends upon the supposition that arbitrators will accord
preclusive effect to the liability determinations made in court.91  The
caselaw suggests that they should—i.e., the doctrine of Parklane Ho-
siery v. Shore ought to apply with full force in the judicial-to-arbitral
context: “Arbitrators are not free to ignore the preclusive effect of
88. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331–32 (1979) (“The general rule should
be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where . . . the
application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow
the use of offensive collateral estoppel.”).
89. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 662.
90. Id. at 669. In these arrangements it will be particularly important for the state to retain
control of the litigation, since the private counsel will have an interest in obtaining a judicial
resolution that can be retailed in arbitrations.  But that is nothing extraordinary: the state must
retain ultimate authority in any event under the law of most states. Id. (“The principal legal
constraint is the requirement, imposed by several courts, that the AG must maintain total con-
trol over all key decision making lest the retainer agreement [with private counsel] violate public
policy as an unlawful delegation of the AG’s authority.”).
91. It appears settled that determinations made in the arbitral fora are accorded preclusive
effects in subsequent litigation. See Wayne J. Positan & Domenick Carmagnola, Employment
Torts, in BUSINESS TORTS LITIGATION 81, 123 (David A. Soley et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) (citing
examples where preceding arbitration decisions were deemed to have preclusive effect in subse-
quent court proceedings).  This appears to be the case even where “the arbitration procedures,
especially regarding discovery, may offer less protection than those of a civil trial.”  Steven P.
Nonkes, Note, Reducing the Unfair Effects of Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Through Damages
Limits, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1474 (2009).
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prior judgments under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel.”92
B. The Return on Investment
Tremendous benefits obtain from a judicial determination of liabil-
ity.  First, if there is an underlying fee-shifting statute,93 lawyers can
recover their fees and costs in the case of an individual claimant or in
representing an arbitration-free client seeking an injunction or declar-
atory judgment.  The current practice is for courts to grant class coun-
sel attorneys’ fees on a rate-times-hours-worked lodestar basis
(generally without a multiplier94) in non-common-fund, statutory fee-
shifting cases.95  If the claim is brought by the public enforcer—i.e., by
the legal staff of a state attorney general, agency or other public en-
tity, or in conjunction with private lawyers—the costs of proving
wrongdoing are paid in salaries to public officials or in accordance
with contracts entered into with private lawyers.96  In either event, the
ability to recover these initial investment costs is critical to the profit-
ability of the next phase of the venture.
Importantly, however, expert costs are generally not recoupable.97
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the “costs” recoverable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) ex-
clude expert witness fees, and that the cost-shifting provisions of stat-
utes, such as the Clayton Act, simply do “not permit a shift of expert
92. Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Aircraft Braking
Sys. Corp. v. Local 856, UAW, 97 F.3d 155, 159 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Collins v. D.R. Horton,
Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1097 (D. Ariz. 2005) (“The reasons for requiring arbitrators to apply
res judicata and collateral estoppel are the same as those underlying the doctrines themselves—
finality, protection of judgments, prevention of duplicative litigation, and avoidance of inconsis-
tent results.”); Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 193 (7th Cir. 1996); John Morrell & Co. v. Local
Union 304A, United Food and Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1990).
93. Alexander G. Osevala, Comment, Let’s Settle This: A Proposed Offer of Judgment for
Pennsylvania, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 185, 195 (2012) (noting that there are over “200 federal and
close to 2,000 state statutes that allow the shifting of attorneys’ fees”).  These include civil rights
statutes, see, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006); Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fee Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006), employment-related statutes, see, e.g.,
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (2006); Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k) (2006), and consumer rights statutes.
94. See, e.g., Purdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1674 (2010) (finding that en-
hancement of the lodestar may only be awarded in “rare” and “exceptional” circumstances).
95. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 24.13 (1995) (noting that in statutory
fee cases “the lodestar is the appropriate method”).
96. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note at 3, at 668–72 (describing contracting strategies be-
tween public and private enforcers).
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2008).
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witness fees.”98  Not all cases require expensive or extensive expert
engagement, but for those that do, counsel will necessarily factor this
cost into the initial determination of whether the case is worth the
investment.
Second, the antecedent court proceeding may make available a list
of injured victims, either through discovery or in the case of judicially
mandated class notice.99  Once lawyers can contact victims to explain
the nature of the claim, they can structure a variety of agreements that
would allow the claimant to transfer, assign, or pay a percentage of
recovery upon success of her claim in arbitration.  Because the attor-
ney is acting for herself and not representing the claim holder in a
legal proceeding, ethical restrictions should not stand in the way.  For
example, neither Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a), which
imposes special duties on attorneys who seek to enter into a business
transaction with a client, nor Model Rule 7.3(a), which prohibits direct
solicitation of a client and limits an attorney’s freedom of action com-
pared to an arbitration entrepreneur who is not an attorney, would
apply to our model.100
The transaction costs of contacting each claimant and negotiating
each retainer agreement will be high, but attorneys will have an incen-
tive to run as many arbitrations as possible off a single liability judg-
ment to increase their overall profit.101  Also, we can imagine lawyers
negotiating volume discounts on arbitration rates and neutrals’ fees,
98. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 94, 99–100 (1991); see also Crawford
Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442 (1987).
99. This assumes that the information is not protected by a protective order—which typically
limits information to the instances of the litigation for which it was produced—which is far more
likely in a case brought on behalf of an arbitration-free client or when representing the state.
100. Model Rule 1.8(a) limits the circumstances under which a lawyer may enter into a “busi-
ness transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other
pecuniary interest adverse to a client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2013).
Model Rule 7.3(a) prohibits “in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact” to solicit
professional employment. Id. R. 7.3(a)  A lawyer may contact a nonclient to solicit a nonprofes-
sional business relationship. See, e.g., Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1
(2002) (finding that a lawyer may contact nonclients to market financial products and may mar-
ket financial products to clients as long safeguards required by Model Rule 1.8(a) are observed).
101. It is not obvious that the transaction costs of aggregating small-value claims are necessa-
rily prohibitive.  In Australia, for example, litigation funding firms such as IMF (Australia) Ltd.
have built a successful business model based on opt-in consumer class actions. See CHRISTO-
PHER HODGES ET AL., LITIGATION FUNDING: STATUS AND ISSUES 55–57, available at http://www.
csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/ReportonLitigationFunding.pdf. (“Absent legislative change that would
enable a funder to recover from all members of a class (and such a rule would be highly ques-
tionable on constitutional grounds), the right to recovery has to be contractual.  Thus, funders
need to have contracted with all, or at least a sufficient number, of class members before com-
mitting their money.”).
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which would also incentivize greater numbers of claims in order to
reduce overall transaction costs.
Importantly, profit margins in these individual arbitrations would
remain small—but because other costs can be significantly reduced or
recouped on the hybrid model, any damages awarded in the individual
arbitrations are gravy.  Nevertheless, the low profit margins will make
many claims unattractive to many lawyers, and more generally, will
render this model an imperfect substitute for class action litigation.
Still, we think the hybrid approach has the potential to be a “second
best” in a world purged of the class action device, where lawyers ex-
perienced in aggregate litigation are seeking ways to ply their trade,
and where the alternative is that vast numbers of small-value claims
are simply never brought.102
IV. THE CLAIMS-BUYING MODEL
A second and complementary model envisions “arbitration entre-
preneurs”—either lawyers or nonlawyers—buying up the claims of
similarly situated plaintiffs and then filing a single arbitration seeking
to collectively resolve the hundreds, or even thousands, of accrued
claims.103  To some extent, this model proceeds from fairly straightfor-
ward business principles: for example, the initial legal research and
reconnaissance into the strength and value proposition of the legal
claim, as well as its potential risks and costs, resembles the inquiry
that any entrepreneur would undertake prior to investment.  Pricing
and purchasing the claims on the open market should also be fairly
clear cut.  The questions that this model provokes will center on the
buying of legal claims and the bundling of those claims into a single
arbitral hearing or a series of informally aggregated, streamlined
hearings.
102. Some commentators believe that class action lawyers are moving entirely away from
fields typically associated with aggregate litigation. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham & John M.
Golden, From PI to IP: Yet Another Unexpected Effect of Tort Reform (July 12, 2012) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878966.
103. From the perspective of the claims-buying model, lawyers and nonlawyers are the same
in every respect: A lawyer buying a claim and litigating it on her own behalf is not representing a
client nor earning a fee (although they may be a client and may pay a fee to a lawyer who may be
in fact, themselves). See Ness v. Gurstel Chargo, P.A., 933 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (D. Minn. 2013).
Note that in at least one state (New York) attorneys are prohibited from purchasing legal
claims for themselves from anyone. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 488 (McKinney 2005) (“An attorney
or counselor shall not . . . take an assignment of or be in any manner interested in buying or
taking an assignment of a . . . thing in action, with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an
action thereon.”).
474 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:447
A. Buying Claims
Consumers have legally enforceable rights and obligations, which
may have monetary value.  For example, if a consumer has purchased
a product, she has rights in warranty and tort law in the event of a
legally cognizable injury.104  The conventional way to transfer these
rights is by assignment.105  An assignment is the act of transferring to
another all or part of one’s property, interest, or rights.106  While the
transfer of legal claims was prohibited at early common law, the rule
of nonassignability has been almost fully abandoned,107 with the ex-
ception of personal injury claims.108  Importantly, for the purpose of
the claims-buying model, the modern law of assignment does not dis-
tinguish between purchases of single claims as opposed to multiple
claims.109
Indeed, bulk assignment of claims has a long history in the United
States,110 as courts have come to recognize the benefits of bundling
104. See Robert Cooter, Commodifying Liability, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 139 (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999).
105. See Andrea Pinna, Financing Civil Litigation: The Case for the Assignment and Securi-
tization of Liability Claims, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE: A
LEGAL, EMPIRICAL, AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 119 (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2010); see
also Harold R. Weinberg, Tort Claims as Intangible Property: An Exploration from an Assignee’s
Perspective, 64 KY. L.J. 49 (1975).
106. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 1 (2010).
107. See Osuna v. Albertson, 184 Cal. Rptr. 338, 345 (Ct. App. 1982) (noting “the tendency of
modern jurisprudence [to] strongly favor[ ] the assignability and the survivability of things in
action” (emphasis omitted)); McKenna v. Oliver, 159 P.3d 697, 699 (Colo. App. 2006) (finding
that Colorado law generally favors the assignability of claims, with an exception for causes of
action for invasion of privacy); Conrad Bros. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 640 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Iowa
2001) (“[T]he law now generally favors the assignability of choses in action, and courts have
permitted the assignment of insurance policies under statutes providing for the assignment of
contracts in exchange for a money payment.”); Lemley v. Pizzica, 36 Pa. D. & C.2d 327, 330 (Ct.
Com. Pl. 1964) (“The trend of judicial decisions as to the assignability of certain causes of action
is to enlarge, rather than to restrict the causes that may be assigned.”); Wis. Bankers Ass’n Inc. v.
Mut. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 291 N.W.2d 869, 876 (Wis. 1980) (describing the principle of assignabil-
ity as “exemplifying a trend of increasing commercial flexibility,” shared by the courts and
legislature).
108. This exception is enforced everywhere except in Texas. See, e.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Jinkins, 739 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex. 1987) (“[A] cause of action for damages for personal injuries
may be sold or assigned [in Texas].”).
109. The Supreme Court has held that an assignee could purchase the contract claims of ap-
proximately 1,400 payphone operators against various major long-distance phone companies,
even if the assignment required the assignee to return all of the damages recovered to the assign-
ors (in exchange for a fee, the assignee took the claims “lock, stock, and barrel” and promised to
remit “all proceeds” collected from the defendants to the assignors).  Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P.
v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 272, 286 (2008).
110. See, e.g., McCord v. Martin, 166 P. 1014, 1015 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917) (assignment of
other shareholders’ fraud claims to one shareholder to prosecute upheld); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Fuller, 23 A. 193 (Conn. 1891) (policyholders assigned claims to Fuller to prosecute after he had
successfully sued the defendant in a prior proceeding; assignments were upheld against allega-
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claims.111  Nonetheless, barriers may persist against the purchase of
claims by laypersons or lawyers.112  In a minority of jurisdictions, leg-
islation imposes limitations on the assignment of claims for specula-
tion or profit.113  Other states have held that bulk assignments for
profit by parties without any connection to the underlying claim are
against public policy.114  In those states where bulk assignments are
illegal, arbitration entrepreneurs could get around the prohibition, ei-
ther by offering their services as “representatives” of the consumer in
exchange for a large portion—perhaps all—of the recovery (minus a
tions of champerty).  In the Sprint opinion, Sprint Commc’ns, 544 U.S. at 283–84, Justice Breyer
pointed to Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., which involved approximately 2,000 individual
claims assigned to a single assignee who then brought 2,000 suits in order to collect (and remit)
the damages suffered by the assignors.  Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 253 U.S. 117 (1920).
111. E.g., Fuller, 23 A. at 196 (“It would manifestly be both useful and convenient to policy-
holders of the plaintiff residing in this state, who . . . having . . . just demands, the individual
enforcement of which, to any persons in ordinary circumstances, would be so expensive and
difficult as to amount to a practical impossibility, that a more fortunate person, of experience,
ability, and inclination, should assist them, and wait for his compensation until the suits were
determined, and be paid out of the fruits of it.”).
112. It should be noted that the purchase of claims to be arbitrated by an attorney in her own
name is not the same thing as the purchase of a claim by an attorney from her client, which may
raise serious ethical issues. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.8(i) (2013) (law-
yer may not acquire an interest in cause of action of client).  This does not prohibit a lawyer from
purchasing a claim from a nonclient, though some states prohibit this practice by statute. See,
e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 2005) (prohibiting an attorney from taking an assignment
of a claim in order to bring suit upon it).
113. For example, New York’s Judicial Law section 489 provides, in part, that no person or
corporation shall “solicit, buy or take an assignment of, or be in any manner interested in buying
or taking an assignment of . . . [a] thing in action, or any claim or demand, with the intent and for
the purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon.”  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (emphasis ad-
ded).  This restriction has been interpreted quite broadly, and allows for the purchase of legal
rights, which may require litigation to be realized if informal means fail.  As the New York Court
of Appeals recently stated, § 489 distinguishes between an assignee “who acquires a right in
order to make money from litigating it” and “one who acquires a right in order to enforce it.”
Trust for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortg. Investors, Inc. v. Love Funding
Corp., 918 N.E.2d 889, 894 (N.Y. 2009).
114. See, e.g., Accrued Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., 298 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2002)
(company with expertise in forensic accounting took assignments of the legal claims of commer-
cial tenants in over fifty shopping malls and promised to remit to the assignors between
50%–60% of any discrepancies discovered and paid to the company by the assignors’ landlords,
some of which were in Maryland; this was held to violate Maryland public policy against cham-
perty).  Minnesotan courts have struck down bulk assignments to claims agents on behalf of
landowners. See, e.g., Gammons v. Gulbranson, 80 N.W. 779 (Minn. 1899); Gammons v. John-
son, 78 N.W. 1035 (Minn. 1899); Huber v. Johnson, 70 N.W. 806 (Minn. 1897).  In these cases,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held the conduct of all the parties—including the layperson who
took partial assignments in the causes of action and the lawyer who sued the railroad—violated
Minnesota’s public policy.  This is still good law in Minnesota.
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small payment paid in advance),115 or by buying a share of the under-
lying property interest for a token amount.116
B. Challenges to Aggregating Purchased Claims
When our arbitration entrepreneur has purchased as many discrete
claims as possible at the right price, she will then seek to resolve them
all in a single arbitral session.  The claim-buying model is contingent
upon successfully aggregating purchased claims in the arbitral fora, as
this is crucial for the entrepreneur to recoup the costs of investigating
and purchasing the claims.  We suspect that defendants faced with
these massive aggregations will immediately call foul and assert,
among other things, that contractual definitions of a “claim” subject to
arbitration do not contemplate multitudes of individual claims bun-
dled together to be decided as a collective.117  Defendants are clearly
uncomfortable with nonclass aggregation of arbitration claims, as il-
lustrated by AT&T’s post-Concepcion response to three law firms’ ef-
forts to sign up individual AT&T customers to arbitrate claims that
the company’s proposed merger with T-Mobile violated the Clayton
Act.118  One of the firms, Bursor & Fisher, P.A., sued the FCC for the
release of data relating to the merger, and then posted this informa-
115. Arbitral bodies generally permit a consumer to have a representative appear on her be-
half before the neutral, and this right is almost certainly part of the “best practices” endorsed by
major arbitral bodies. See, e.g., Principle 9: Comments, in NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVI-
SORY COMM., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, ARBITRATION CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL
(2010) [hereinafter AAA ARBITRATION PROTOCOL], available at http://www.in.gov/dfi/2623.htm
(“The right to be counseled by an attorney or other representative is an important one that is
frequently reflected in standard rules governing ADR proceedings.”).
116. Ironically, Justice Breyer argued that the fact that a prohibition against assignment could
be so easily circumvented by purchasing a share of the property interest at stake for a dollar
supported the Court’s conclusion that there was no “practical” argument for barring mass assign-
ments to claims agents.  Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 289
(2008).  Chief Justice Roberts argued that the lack of any interest in the underlying claim made
all the difference in the world for Article III standing: “‘When you [ain’t] got nothing, you got
nothing to lose.’” Id. at 301 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting BOB DYLAN, Like a Rolling
Stone, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED (Columbia Records 1965)).
117. Joel D. Rosen & James B. Shrimp, Yes to Arbitration, but Did I Also Agree to Class
Action and Consolidated Arbitration?, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 175, 176 (2011) (“A franchisor might
opt for the streamlined procedures and limited review of arbitration for a single dispute with a
franchisee that involves limited monetary exposure; however, the franchisor might not opt for
the streamlined procedures and limited review of the arbitration of dozens, if not hundreds or
thousands, of claims brought in a consolidated or class action arbitration with millions of dollars
at stake.”).
118. In June 2011, AT&T announced a $39 billion takeover of T-Mobile that was immediately
controversial.  The Justice Department, the Federal Communications Commission and various
state regulators objected to the merger, and in August 2011, the DOJ filed suit alleging the
proposed merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.  Complaint at 4, United States v. AT&T
Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01560 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2011).
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tion on its website, urging consumers to individually arbitrate their
claims in order to block the merger.119  The firms filed more than
1,000 individual demands for arbitration—each “almost identical to
each other aside from the names and addresses of the claimants”120—
before AT&T eventually enjoined the arbitrations on the grounds that
the demand to block the merger exceeded the scope of the arbitration
agreement.121  We should expect similar responses from defendants
faced with mass arbitrations under our claims-buying model, although
such challenges are belied by the prominent example of claims-buying
and aggregation in the debt collection industry, which we consider in
detail in the final subsection.
Nearly every arbitration clause we have examined broadly defines a
“claim” as a dispute or controversy between the parties.  Presumably,
once our arbitration entrepreneur has lawfully purchased the “claim,”
she has the right to adjudicate it to judgment in accord with the terms
of the arbitration agreement.  It is fairly clear that, where the underly-
ing agreement does not contemplate or explicitly prohibits class arbi-
tration, our entrepreneur cannot aggregate her claims in that form.122
But nothing in the underlying agreement nor in the FAA itself ap-
pears to preclude informal aggregation of claims by a single owner in
a single hearing.  Indeed, even the most aggressive peddlers of class
action waivers require only that “all parties to the arbitration must be
individually named” and proclaim that “there is no right or authority
for any claims to be arbitrated on a class action or consolidated basis
. . . or joined or consolidated with claims of other parties.”123  But the
legal entrepreneur would name each claimant from whom she pur-
chased a claim in her notice of arbitration.  Further, resolving all pur-
chased, related claims in one fell swoop is not the equivalent of
joinder or consolidation as those terms are used in the Federal
Rules.124  Nor is this form of aggregation a class action, as it does not
119. See Scott A. Bursor, Victory!, FIGHT THE MERGER, http://www.fightthemerger.com (last
visited June 26, 2013).
120. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Bernardi, Nos. C 11-03992 CRB, C 11-04412 CRB, 2011 WL
5079549, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011).
121. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Smith, No. 11-cv-5157, 2011 WL 5924460 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
7, 2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Gonnello, No. 11 Civ. 5636(PKC), 2011 WL 4716617 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 7, 2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Bushman, No. 11-80922-CIV, 2011 WL 5924666 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 23, 2011).
122. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773–76 (2010) (find-
ing that a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there
is a contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to class arbitration).
123. AmEx Agreement, supra note 77.
124. While there seems currently to be no formal right of a participant in arbitration to de-
mand that her arbitrations be scheduled on the same day if she has multiple claims against the
same opponent, there is some evidence that arbitral bodies have, in the past, accommodated this
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seek to meet the procedural requirements of Rule 23 and does not bar
subsequent claims.125
C. A Case Study: Small-Value Debt Collection Litigation
Despite the economic inefficiencies inherent in pursuing small-
value claims, companies are nonetheless expending a great deal of
time, money, and effort doing just that.126  The nation’s most vigorous
civil law enforcement is the consumer debt collection industry, where
professional companies pursue claims against consumers involving rel-
atively small amounts.127  Typically, these consumer debts are pur-
chased for 4% of face value, a discount which reflects that “[d]ebt
buyers typically do not attempt collections on all accounts they
purchase, do not usually realize recoveries on every account for which
collections are attempted, and do not typically recover the full face
value on accounts for which they do realize recoveries.”128  The basic
rather simple and easy request.  One arbitral body, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), cre-
ated a subsidiary (Forthright) whose purpose was to administer arbitrations on behalf of corpo-
rate clients who were plaintiffs in the hundreds of thousands of arbitrations brought before its
neutrals.  During Forthright board meetings, board members discussed “methods to increase the
number of large batch claims being processed by arbitrators.”  Complaint at 23, State v. Nat’l
Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2009) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/pdf/pressreleases/signedfiledcomplaintarbitrationcompany
.pdf.  The practicality of such coordination (and the pretextual nature of any objection from
defendants party to the arbitration agreement) is illustrated by the best practices recommended
by the AAA, which strongly encourages the use of remote arbitrations. See Principle 7: Practical
Suggestions, in AAA ARBITRATION PROTOCOL, supra note 115 (“In some cases, it may be rea-
sonable to conduct proceedings by telephone or electronic data transmission, with or without
submission of documents. Such options may be particularly desirable in the case of arbitration of
small claims, since the parties have the choice of going to small claims court.” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted)).
125. The Court rejected the argument that mass assignments by multiple claimholders to a
single claims agent who would litigate on their behalf was a “circumvention” of Rule 23. See
Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 290–91 (2008).  As the court
noted in that case—which, we recognize, was not a mass arbitration but a mass lawsuit—class
actions “are but one of several methods by which multiple similarly situated parties get similar
claims resolved at one time and in one federal forum.” Id. at 291.  We couldn’t agree more, and
the claims-buying model should be seen as a separate but parallel legal pathway to achieve many
(but not all) of the same goals as a class action.
126. See Goldberg, supra note 39, at 742–43.
127. The FTC reports that the average face value of the consumer debt accounts purchased by
companies whose only purpose is to sue on those accounts is $1,348. JON LEIBOWITZ ET AL.,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, app.
tbl.2 (2013) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].  The face value of the accounts purchased is not an
accurate measure of the value of the claim made by the debt buyers as plaintiffs, since the debt
sold is “charged off” debt, which means that the original owner of the debt (a bank) has deter-
mined that it was unlikely to recover it. Id.
128. Id. at 23 (footnotes omitted).
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business model is to cast a broad net in the hope of catching a small
piece of a portion of a large portfolio.129
Given a purchase price of four cents to the dollar, the actual recov-
ery for any claim that is made (and there is no reason to assume that
debt buyers make a claim on every debt they purchase) is most likely
a fraction of the original face amount.  For the debt buyer to turn a
profit, however, the actual recovery must still be greater, in the aggre-
gate, than his information and transaction costs, plus his original in-
vestment in the aggregate.  Given that information and transaction
costs typically exceed the compensation that any single case can pro-
duce, there is no reason to believe that merely aggregating small-value
consumer cases changes that equation.  Aggregation of a small-value
claim without an additional source of savings merely reproduces the
negative-value problem in bulk.130  So how do the debt buyers enforce
their legal rights without losing money?131  They sue.
The number of cases filed against consumers by debt buying compa-
nies in recent years is staggering.  A 2010 report from the National
Consumer Law Center, based on data gathered by journalists and
other sources, gave a snapshot of the volume of the litigation: Be-
tween 2000 and 2005 debt collectors in Massachusetts filed 575,000
lawsuits, or 60% of all that state’s civil lawsuits.132  Minnesota saw the
volume of debt collection lawsuits double between 2006 to 2008, and
default judgments rose 58% in a single year.133  In the San Francisco
129. Id. at 23 n.21 (“[Debt] buyers hope to make a profit by collecting at least a small percent-
age of [the accounts they purchase].” (alteration in original) (quoting RACHEL TERP & LAUREN
BROWN, PAST DUE: WHY DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES AND THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY
NEED REFORM NOW 3 (2011))).
130. This is assuming that the variation in compensatory awards in small-value cases is not
large and that the average compensatory award in a small-value case does not exceed the aver-
age sum of the information and transaction costs in an individual small-value case.
131. Some have suggested that debt buyers are able to keep transaction costs low by seeking
payment by informal means, such as telephone calls and other contacts. See RICK JURGENS &
ROBERT J. HOBBS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE DEBT MACHINE: HOW THE COLLECTION
INDUSTRY HOUNDS CONSUMERS AND OVERWHELMS COURTS 6 (2010).  But others observe that
informal collection methods are decreasing, not increasing, as the ownership of debt moves from
the original debt holders to professional debt purchasers. See JON LEIBOWITZ ET AL., FED.
TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLEC-
TION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 5 (2010) [hereinafter FTC, A BROKEN SYSTEM] (“Collec-
tors may also employ litigation more quickly than in the past; industry sources ‘have noted that
the growth of the debt-buying industry has resulted in increases in collection lawsuits because
entities that purchase delinquent debt often use collection law firms as their primary tool for
recovery.’” (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS:
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT COULD BETTER REFLECT THE EVOLVING DEBT COL-
LECTION MARKETPLACE AND USE OF TECHNOLOGY 41 (2009))).
132. JURGENS & HOBBS, supra note 131, at 13 (“In Boston, 40,000 debt collection suits ac-
counted for 85 percent of all small claims cases over a five year period.”).
133. Id. at 16.
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Bay Area, lawsuits filed to collect consumer debt rose from 53,700 in
2007 to 96,000 in 2009.134  In New York City, “researchers concluded
that a surge in debt collection lawsuits was a major contributor to a
near tripling in all civil court lawsuits, from 213,000 in 2000 to 618,000
in 2007.”135  The use of outside attorneys ballooned to meet the de-
mand of debt buyers.  One debt buyer, Encore Capital Group, which
hires outside law firms to do collections and bring its claims on a con-
tingency fee basis, filed almost 450,000 lawsuits in 2008, which was an
18% increase over 2007.  Portfolio Recovery Associates, Inc., which
also used contingent fee firms, saw its legal fee expenses increase 14%
in 2007, from $29 million to $33 million.136  Academic research sup-
ports these observations.137
And it is not simply that debt collection companies are inexhaust-
ible litigators, but that they have learned how to litigate on the mar-
gins in a highly cost-effective manner.  Partly, this is a function of the
lack of competition within the industry: the FTC reports that, even
though “there do not seem to be significant barriers to entry into the
debt buying industry,” the industry is dominated by “large debt buyers
[who] purchase most debt.”138  For example, one study of Indiana con-
sumer debt litigation found that thirteen debt buying firms accounted
for 79% of all filings, with one firm dominating the docket by filing
22% of all consumer debt plaintiff suits.139  A similar pattern was
found in Dallas: two firms appeared in 36% of all the consumer debt
suits, and five plaintiffs comprised 64% of all the suits filed.140
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing CONSUMER RIGHTS PROJECT, MFY LEGAL SERVS. INC., JUSTICE DISSERVED:
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE EXCEPTIONALLY LOW APPEARANCE RATE BY DEFENDANTS
IN LAWSUITS FILED IN THE CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 5 (2008)).
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Judith Fox, Do We Have a High Debt Collection Crisis? Some Cautionary Tales
of Debt Collection in Indiana, 24 LOY. CONSUMER. L. REV. 355, 370 (2012) (noting an increase in
the civil docket between 2005 and 2009 in Indiana due to debt collection cases); Richard M.
Hynes, Broke but Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Courts, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1,
24–25 (2008) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of civil suits filed in Virginia are consumer debt
collection filings, and the evidence suggests that consumer debt collection accounts for a very
high percentage of the civil filings of other states.” (footnote omitted)); Mary Spector, Debts,
Defaults and Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection Litigation on Consumers and
Courts, 6 VA. L. &. BUS. REV. 257, 279 (2011) (describing debt buyer cases as making up a
“sizeable portion” of the Dallas County docket).
138. FTC REPORT, supra note 127, at 14.  In 2008, nine companies bought 76.1% of all con-
sumer debt (with a face value of $55 billion)—and 78% of that was bought directly from credit
card issuers who, presumably, found it too expensive to try to enforce their legal rights. Id. at 14,
app. tbl.1.
139. Fox, supra note 137, at 372.
140. Spector, supra note 137, at 280.
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The concentration of claiming by a handful of firms necessarily pro-
duces a form of specialization.  And, in turn, specialization by its very
nature produces economies of scale by reducing both information and
transaction costs.  Finally, where there is concentration and specializa-
tion, cost-effective aggregation of like claims becomes possible.  Not
only are information and transaction costs reduced by lowering the
cost of regularly performing certain tasks (or getting certain informa-
tion) as compared to an individual who completes such tasks only oc-
casionally, but also by transforming these tasks so they can be
efficiently performed for thousands, if not tens of thousands, of simi-
lar legal claims.141
The debt collection industry has used the high volume of claims to
take advantage of two features of small-claims courts: (1) the high de-
fault rate by defendant consumers;142 and (2) the minimum factual
foundation required by the fora to sustain a default judgment.143
These two factors combine to lower the cost of making a claim by
reducing transaction costs to a minimum and information costs to po-
tentially near zero, since the risk of being challenged on the factual
foundation of the claim is, it turns out, close to zero.
141. There is some evidence that this is exactly what has happened after the debt buying
industry took over the enforcement of the banks’ and other creditors’ legal rights.  The main
innovation was to figure out how to turn arbitration and small claims courts into credi-
tor–plaintiff “judgment mills.” See Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem
in Small Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH.
L. 259, 272 (2011) (“‘[S]mall claims courts’ have in reality become ‘creditor’s courts’ . . . .”); see
also JURGENS & HOBBS, supra note 131, at 13 n.45 (“A large debt buyer said that filing cases
against debtors in small claims and similar courts ‘allows us to work accounts that we would not
normally pursue through the use of contingent fee collection attorneys because of cost.’” (quot-
ing PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCS., FORM 10-K/A, at 11 (2008)).
142. See, e.g., FTC, A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 131, at 7 & n.18 (estimating that the rate
of default judgments in consumer debt cases in small claims court is 60%–95%); CMTY. DEV.
PROJECT, URBAN JUSTICE CTR., DEBT WEIGHT: THE CONSUMER CREDIT CRISIS IN NEW YORK
CITY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORKING POOR 21 (2007) (80%); CLAUDIA WILNER & NASOAN
SHEFTEL-GOMES, DEBT DECEPTION: HOW DEBT BUYERS ABUSE THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO PREY
ON LOWER-INCOME NEW YORKERS 1 (2010) (90%–95%); Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out
of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85
CAL. L. REV. 79, 119 (1997) (70%–90%); Fox, supra note 137, at 379 (74%).
143. Spector concluded that more than 95% of the complaints filed by consumer debt plain-
tiffs in Dallas County “failed to provide any information regarding date of default or calculation
of the amount allegedly owed, allegations the FTC suggests are necessary to insuring due pro-
cess.”  Spector, supra note 137, at 298.  A further reason why debt buyers are rational to invest
so little in information about their cases is that they can limit their losses if a defendant answers
the complaint and challenges the plaintiff’s claim in court.  As Spector observed in Dallas, there
were a surprising number of voluntary dismissals without prejudice in the cases she observed
when the defendant appeared (62%, but 75% if a lawyer appeared with the defendant). Id. at
295.
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The debt buying industry’s experience with mass small-value litiga-
tion has important lessons for us.  First, while much of the mass litiga-
tion action has taken place in small-claims court in recent years, the
debt buying industry initially launched its mass claiming campaign in
the arbitral fora.144  Plainly, these creditors perceived no legal barriers
to exercising their rights under their contracts to arbitrate hundreds of
thousands of claims.  The arbitral bodies were able to handle the flood
of cases, but only because they were dealing with a group of highly
concentrated specialty debt purchasers who were repeat players
before the neutrals.145  Business Week described a firm that had
grown to more than 1,000 employees and twenty-four offices, oper-
ated two call centers, and “had an infrastructure that supported 35,000
lawsuits per month, 20,000 arbitration filings per month and $55 mil-
lion in collections per month.”146
Second, however, it is not clear the arbitral bodies are similarly
equipped to handle the large volume of claims that arbitration entre-
preneurs may bring to them on a claims-buying model in the post-class
action era.  In its 2010 report, the FTC concluded that consumer debt
arbitration “failed” to provide consumers with “meaningful choice”
and was not “fair to creditors, collectors, and consumers.”147  The jus-
tification for arbitration (and the sacrifice of traditional elements of
adjudication) had not been realized, and the problem did not lie just
in one “bad apple” like the NAF.  Even the AAA’s specialized con-
sumer debt arbitration program was a dismal failure in part because
97.8% of consumers did not participate, which resulted in default
144. See STAFF OF DOMESTIC POLICY SUBCOMM. OF THE H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T
REFORM, 111TH CONG., JUSTICE OR AVARICE: THE MISUSE OF LITIGATION TO HARM CONSUM-
ERS 3–4 (2009) (describing the shift from arbitration to small claims court in consumer debt
cases).
145. In 2006 the National Arbitration Forum heard 214,000 consumer debt arbitration claims,
of which 125,000 were filed by two law firms (who also partly owned the companies that owned
the debt). See In re Nat’l Arbitration Forum Trade Practices Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 832, 835 (D.
Minn. 2010).  The number of arbitrators used to process this flood of cases was extraordinarily
small, and the speed with which they disposed of the cases was remarkable. See Press Release,
Public Citizen, Mandatory Arbitration Stacks Deck Against Credit Cardholders, Data Show
(Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=2519
(“90 percent of the NAF cases were handled by just 28 arbitrators, who awarded businesses $185
million.  One arbitrator handled 68 cases in a single day—an average of one every seven min-
utes, assuming an eight-hour day . . . .”).
146. See ROBERT J. HOBBS & RICK JURGENS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORCED ARBI-
TRATION: CONSUMERS NEED PERMANENT RELIEF 10 (2010) (quoting Robert Berner & Brian
Grow, Banks vs. Consumers (Guess Who Wins), BUSINESSWEEK, June 16, 2008, at 72).
147. FTC, A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 131, at 40–41.
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judgments for creditors in 95.2% of the cases they brought before the
arbitrators.148
We recognize, therefore, that the post-class action era poses both an
opportunity and a challenge to entrepreneurs who want to do well by
“doing good” for consumers.  If the promise of mass arbitration for
consumers becomes a reality, stakeholders in the arbitral profession
will have to work together to help the major arbitral bodies develop
structures that are large and robust enough to handle thousands of
claims.  The leading arbitral bodies have, until now, rarely attempted
to process claims at this scale, and when they did, they failed misera-
bly.  An explicit commitment to developing truly meaningful mecha-
nisms for virtual hearings and efficient scheduling are at the top of our
list, and we see no legal reason why consumers cannot demand this
sort of accommodation.149
V. CONCLUSION
We have described two possible models that might overcome the
anti-aggregation jurisprudence of recent years.  Neither is a sure bet;
both face serious challenges, and even if used in tandem by sophisti-
cated legal risk takers, these approaches do not provide a very satis-
factory substitute for class action litigation.  But if we still believe that,
in this post-class action moment, sound public policy requires that
some form of aggregative procedure be available for small-claims
plaintiffs who would not have the incentive or resources to remedy
harms or deter wrongdoing in one-on-one proceedings, then we must
begin to examine second-best proposals, as imperfect as they may be.
The alternative is too grim to conceive.
148. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in Arbitration and in
Court, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 92 & tbl.3 (2011).  The program was designed to process
thousands of claims brought by a single creditor against consumers. See id. at 104–05 (describing
the program).  This disappointing result is consistent with the FTC’s conclusion, which was that
“over ninety percent of consumers do not participate in [consumer debt] arbitration.”  FTC, A
BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 131, at 54.  This estimate was based on a submission from Richard
W. Naimark of the AAA. Id. at 54 n.268.
149. In fact, we would be curious to know why a defendant would resist an arbitration entre-
preneur’s reasonable demands for this sort of flexibility.  If arbitral bodies failed to adopt these
mechanisms, then state legislatures could require them.  We would be even more curious to
know under what interpretation of the FAA a federal court would hold that such state regulation
is inconsistent with Congress’s goal of promoting arbitration as an alternative to litigation.
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